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The Impact of the Charter on the
Law of Search and Seizure
Tim Quigley*

I. INTRODUCTION
The enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1
in 1982 brought about major changes in the content and protection of
individual rights. This has been particularly pronounced in respect of the
legal rights contained in sections 7 to 14 of the Charter, and perhaps even
more so in the case of section 8, which protects us all from unreasonable
search or seizure. Indeed, the mere fact of section 8’s inclusion in the
Charter and the attendant possibility of the exclusion of evidence where
it has been violated immediately resulted in a sea change from the previous
law.
Prior to 1982, the law of search and seizure was a combination of
statutory provisions and common law rules relating to search, seizure and
police powers, and often overstated statements of the supposed common
law tradition of respecting individual rights. The harsh reality was that
evidence obtained through illegality or impropriety by the authorities
was nonetheless admissible in criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court
of Canada plainly said so in R. v. Wray2 and, although the case turned on
the admissibility of evidence derived from an involuntary confession, it was
clear that this rule also applied to illegal or unreasonable searches and
seizures.
Since 1982, there have been many developments in the law of search
and seizure. Some of these were seminal decisions by the Supreme Court
of Canada. Others have consisted of statutory responses by the federal

*
Professor of Law, University of Saskatchewan. I wish to thank James Stribopoulos for
reading and providing comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11 [hereinafter “the Charter”].
2
[1970] S.C.J. No. 80, 11 C.R.N.S. 235 (S.C.C.).
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and provincial governments to Charter jurisprudence. 3 One striking
consequence of the passage of section 8 is that there is considerably
more law on search and seizure than previously. This paper will provide an
overview of these changes in the law and an assessment of the impact that
the Charter has had in this area of the law. It will not be a comprehensive
analysis of all of the law on search and seizure. Instead, I have attempted
to choose and discuss the highlights from the extensive jurisprudence in
the area.
Because I am critical of some of the legal developments in this area,
a couple of points are worth making at the outset. First, virtually all of
the litigation concerning Charter legal rights and especially in relation to
searches and seizures concerns individuals who are factually guilty. Thus,
there is often a temptation to side with the state authorities when evidence
of culpability has been located despite flaws in the manner in which it was
located. This temptation should be resisted because we must recognize
that innocent persons subjected to the same police behaviour have no
effective remedies and therefore seldom challenge the conduct. Moreover,
an extremely high proportion of criminal cases are disposed of without
going to trial and therefore there is no opportunity to assert the violation
of rights. As a consequence, constitutional safeguards must be examined
in cases where the individual might otherwise be found guilty. If we are
to be fair minded about constitutional rights, we would be well advised to
attempt to put out of our minds what the police actually discovered and
assess the constitutional position as if the individual were factually
innocent.
Second, where the courts have found that constitutional rights trump
police efficiency, they have frequently been accused of “judicial activism”.
In truth, however, because the judiciary has been charged with the oversight
of constitutional safeguards but the document itself is necessarily framed in
general language, judges are obliged to both interpret and apply Charter
provisions. In that sense, of course, they are activists. But it is a role
forced upon them by the nature of their positions and the absence of any
other means of upholding constitutional rights. Later in this paper, I will
suggest that there is another, in my view more dangerous, form of judicial
activism through the creation or extension of common law police powers.
There are two sides to the coinage of judicial activism.
3
Due to the sheer number of provincial and territorial statutory search and seizure powers,
the emphasis of this paper will be on federal enactments. However, for illustrative purposes,
reference will occasionally be made to provincial statutes.
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II. THE PRE-CHARTER POSITION
Before 1982, the Canadian law on search and seizure was not
devoid of legal principle or standards upon which the police and other
state authorities could act. However, in light of the reality that evidence
was admissible no matter how it was obtained, there was relatively little
jurisprudence relating to search and seizure powers and there was
no mechanism by which the judiciary could assess the lawfulness or
reasonableness of such powers. Moreover, in the absence of constitutional
standards and constraints, there were relatively few such laws, certainly
by comparison with the present day.
For instance, what is now section 487 of the Criminal Code4 has
long required that, to justify the issuance of a search warrant, there must
be reasonable grounds both to believe that evidence will be located in
the premises and that the evidence would relate to an offence. Provisions
containing similar standards were included in the old Narcotic Control
Act5 and the Food and Drugs Act,6 although, perhaps consistent with our
ongoing “war on drugs”, these Acts permitted warrantless searches of
places other than dwelling houses. These were presumably enacted in
the tradition of protecting the sanctity of one’s home — the oft-repeated
though patriarchal, “A man’s home is his castle”,7 which, in turn, was
largely premised on the protection of property rights against trespass.8
However, in spite of those legal requirements, a study by the then Law
Reform Commission of Canada found that almost 60 per cent of search
warrants should not have been issued due to non-compliance with the legal
standards.9 The absence of meaningful remedies for non-compliance was
4

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 487 [hereinafter “the Code”]. The version in effect just prior to
passage of the Charter was R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 443. Although there have been several
amendments over time, the essential requirements for the obtaining of a warrant under this
provision have remained the same.
5
Narcotic Control Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-1, s. 12 [rep. S.C. 1996, c. 19, s. 94].
6
Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27, s. 42 [rep. S.C. 1996, c. 19, s. 81].
7
Semayne’s Case (1604), 77 E.R. 194, [1558-1774] All E.R. Rep. 62 (K.B.).
8
Entick v. Carrington (1765), 95 E.R. 807, [1558-1774] All E.R. Rep. 41 (K.B.). Even at
this early stage, there was, however, concern expressed about the importance of protecting privacy
in relation to Entick’s personal papers.
9
Law Reform Commission of Canada, Police Powers: Search and Seizure in Criminal
Law Enforcement (Working Paper 30) (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1983), at 83-91
documented the extent to which police failed to follow proper legal procedures in effecting searches
and seizures. The Commission engaged a panel of judges to evaluate a sample of warrants; the
judges found that only about 40 per cent of the warrants were validly issued. Unfortunately, the
presence of Charter protection and the possibility of excluding evidence obtained through an
improperly issued warrant have apparently not improved the situation. In a study conducted in
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undoubtedly a factor in this slipshoddiness of the authorities. Challenges to
search warrants via certiorari were only of utility in narrow circumstances,
such as where the applicant learned of the warrant’s existence prior to
its execution and in time to launch proceedings. Where a search and
seizure had already occurred, ordering the return of the seized items was
not (nor is it now) inevitable.10 The Wray11 approach ruled out any
challenges to admissibility at a criminal trial. Thus, a failure to abide by
the statutory requirements or even to obtain a search warrant in the first
place had no adverse consequences for the Crown.
Apart from statutory search warrant provisions, there were other
search and seizure powers, both statutory and under the common law.
The aforementioned Narcotic Control Act 12 in sections 10 and 11 and
Food and Drugs Act13 in section 42, for example, permitted warrantless
search and seizure powers in respect of places other than dwellings and
for individuals found therein. Again, probably influenced by the common
law tradition, these powers were premised on reasonable grounds, a not
unusual standard for the exercise of police powers.
But without means of challenging the standards themselves, it was
not inevitable that such provisions would incorporate objectively verifiable
grounds. A good example was section 131 of the then Saskatchewan
Liquor Act,14 which permitted a warrantless search of and seizure from a
motor vehicle on the subjective belief of a peace officer, fettered neither
by a quantitative standard nor an objective assessment of the belief.15
Even more draconian in their breadth were writs of assistance,
essentially carte blanche search warrants issued under four statutes to
peace officers or other state authorities without judicial control or scrutiny

Toronto, it was discovered that 69 per cent of the warrants issued should not have been because of
defects: Casey Hill, Scott Hutchinson & Leslie Pringle, “Search Warrants: Protection or Illusion?”
(2000) 28 C.R. (5th) 89.
10
It was relatively late in the pre-Charter jurisprudence that courts began ordering the
return of seized items: e.g., R. v. Black (1973), 24 C.R.N.S. 203 (B.C.S.C.); Bergeron v.
Deschamps, [1977] S.C.J. No. 45, 73 D.L.R. (3d) 765 (S.C.C.). As Hill et al. in “Search Warrants:
Protection or Illusion?” (2000) 28 C.R. (5th) 89 have pointed out, even today successful certiorari
applications often do not result in the return of the items and, even if they do, the police will
frequently obtain a new warrant on proper grounds and seize the items once again.
11
R. v. Wray, [1970] S.C.J. No. 80, 11 C.R.N.S. 235 (S.C.C.).
12
R.S.C. 1985, c. N-1 [rep. S.C. 1996, c. 19, s. 94].
13
R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27, s. 42 [rep. S.C. 1996, c. 19, s. 18].
14
Liquor Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. L-18, s. 131.
15
After the enactment of the Charter, the provision was found to be unconstitutional in
R. v. D. (I.D.), [1987] S.J. No. 653, 61 C.R. (3d) 292 (Sask. C.A.).
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once issued by a judge.16 The possessor of a writ of assistance could
therefore search and seize at will. After the Charter came into effect,
Parliament repealed these provisions because lower courts had already
noted their obvious non-compliance with constitutional principles.17
Two common law doctrines were also thin on definition or principle:
searches incident to arrest and consent searches. The power to search a
person as an incident of lawful arrest was (and largely still is) a common
law power. Again, because of the Wray18 approach, it was not necessary
in terms of the admissibility of the fruits of such searches to establish
legal parameters. Thus, in R. v. Brezack,19 a throat hold search for drugs
was upheld as a valid exercise of police duty. In the same case, a further
search of the accused’s car attracted no comment whatsoever, either
about whether it was within the ambit of a search incident to arrest or
whether the accused had “consented” to the search. It is now well accepted,
of course, that a person may waive constitutional or legal rights by
consenting to a search or other process but only if certain requirements
are met — free and unequivocal consent with knowledge of the right and
the consequence of foregoing it.20 In the pre-Charter period, as Brezack
implicitly illustrates, consent was more or less equated with obedience
to authority, although late in that period, the Supreme Court accepted
that the equation was not an accurate conception of consent.21
Another common law police power had been shaped to a great
extent by the judiciary. That was the power for police to enter premises
in order to make an arrest. In recognition that such an entry is a trespass
upon the property of the possessor or owner, certain requirements were
established by Eccles v. Bourque22 and R. v. Landry.23 First, there must
have been the requisite grounds for arrest, usually reasonable and probable
grounds. Second, unless the entry was in hot pursuit or other exigent
16
Narcotic Control Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. N-1, s. 10; Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1970,
c. F-27, s. 22; Customs Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-40, ss. 133 and 134; and Excise Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. E-12,
ss. 70 and 71.
17
For example, R. v. Noble, [1984] O.J. No. 3395, 42 C.R. (3d) 209 (Ont. C.A.).
18
R. v. Wray, [1970] S.C.J. No. 80, 11 C.R.N.S. 235 (S.C.C.).
19
[1949] O.J. No. 492, 9 C.R. 73 (Ont. C.A.).
20
For example, Korponay v. Canada (Attorney General), [1982] S.C.J. No. 111, 26 C.R.
(3d) 343 (S.C.C.); R. v. Clarkson, [1986] S.C.J. No. 20, 50 C.R. (3d) 289 (S.C.C.); R. v. Borden,
[1994] S.C.J. No. 82, 33 C.R. (4th) 147 (S.C.C.).
21
For example, R. v. Goldman, [1979] S.C.J. No. 136, 13 C.R. (3d) 228 (S.C.C.); R. v.
Dedman, [1985] S.C.J. No. 45, 46 C.R. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.).
22
[1974] S.C.J. No. 123, 19 C.C.C. (2d) 129 (S.C.C.).
23
[1986] S.C.J. No. 10, 50 C.R. (3d) 55 (S.C.C.).
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circumstances, the police must have provided proper announcement
before entering, such announcement including their status as police officers,
notice of their purpose, and a request to enter. This power was even
extended to summary conviction provincial offences in R. v. Macooh.24
Another area of law in which search and seizure concepts have now
been applied is the regulatory sphere, a topic that will not be dealt with
at length in this paper. Many regulatory schemes depend upon inspections
by authorities, demands to produce licences or other documentation, filing
of reports, etc. These now are subject to Charter analysis, albeit in a less
stringent manner than for criminal prosecutions.25 Previously, however,
there were few constraints other than political to fetter the discretion of
state authorities. Therefore, statutory schemes might, but in no way were
required to, contain standards for or constraints upon the exercise of such
powers.
This is not to suggest that Parliament and legislatures were oblivious
to privacy concerns. As already indicated, in general, search and seizure
powers often were framed in terms of reasonableness. Moreover,
Parliament was attentive to the invasion of privacy brought about by
technology. Wiretap legislation enacted in 1974 was explicitly framed in
terms of protecting privacy and permitting its invasion under the scrutiny
of judges.26 Indeed, the original legislation provided for the automatic
exclusion of evidence obtained without a lawful authorization well before
the constitution provided such a remedy.
In conclusion, the pre-Charter period was one where legal standards
existed but where meaningful remedies for their breach were nearly
non-existent. At the same time, as the advent of the Charter approached, the
courts and Parliament became increasingly attentive to privacy concerns.
This in turn must surely have influenced the interpretation of section 8
that soon followed.

24

[1993] S.C.J. No. 28, 22 C.R. (4th) 70 (S.C.C.).
For a brief analysis of the current position, see: Tim Quigley, Procedure in Canadian
Criminal Law, 2d ed., looseleaf (Toronto: Carswell, 2005), at 8-55–8-58.
26
Protection of Privacy Act, S.C. 1973-74, c. 50, now Part VI of the Criminal Code,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 entitled “Invasion of Privacy”; the legislative scheme has frequently been amended.
The United States Supreme Court in Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967) had already recognized the
threat to privacy posed by wiretaps and had also insisted on judicial authorization, undoubtedly
influencing Parliament to move in the same direction. As originally enacted, an exception to judicial
authorization was permitted where one of the parties to a conversation consented to its interception.
This was found to be unconstitutional in R. v. Duarte, [1990] S.C.J. No. 2, 74 C.R. (3d) 281 (S.C.C.).
25
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III. SEARCH AND SEIZURE UNDER THE CHARTER
1. The Framework for Section 8 Analysis
Before embarking on an analysis of the post-Charter position, it may
be useful to set out the text of section 8: “Everyone has the right to be
secure against unreasonable search or seizure.”
Given its vague and general wording, section 8 might have been
interpreted as permitting any state intrusion that was considered reasonable
in its context, premised on a relatively narrow property rights perspective,
and, perhaps, confined to the type of state conduct most stereotypically
associated with the terminology of “search” and “seizure”. This approach
was essentially the argument advanced by the federal government in Hunter
v. Southam.27 Happily, in what remains the leading judgment on search
and seizure law, the Court took a broader and more purposive approach.
Justice Dickson (as he then was) made several important
pronouncements about the interpretation of the Charter in general and
the specific guarantee in section 8. First, in keeping with the theory that
the Charter must be interpreted in a manner related to its purpose of
protecting rights that are primarily individual in nature, section 8 and
other legal rights must be viewed as constraining, rather than authorizing,
government action. That is, rather than providing authority to the state
to engage in searches and seizures, the section is to be read as limiting
laws authorizing such measures to what is reasonable.
From there, Dickson J. went on to hold that the purpose behind
section 8 is to protect a reasonable expectation of privacy from
unreasonable state intrusion. Drawing upon the American jurisprudence
under their Fourth Amendment protection in relation to search and seizure,
he explicitly rejected a property-based approach to the right. As the United
States Supreme Court held in Katz v. U.S.,28 the protected interest is “the
right to be let alone by other people” and therefore protects “people, not
places”. The difference between a property-based approach and this
broader privacy approach is well illustrated by the facts in Katz. The
case involved police interception of conversations made from a public
telephone booth. Under a property rights analysis, it would be difficult to
see what constitutional protection might be afforded such conversations.
27
Canada (Combines Investigation Act, Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam
Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 41 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hunter v. Southam”].
28
389 U.S. 347, at 350-51 (1967).
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However, under a privacy approach, it is readily apparent that electronic
eavesdropping on a conversation is an infringement of privacy even if
the conversation was conducted from a public phone. This is not to say
that protection of places is not a part of privacy, merely that section 8
protects more than places.
The distinction between protecting privacy and protecting property
is important. An interest in privacy is consistent with the purpose behind
the Charter, namely, to constrain governmental action that is inconsistent
with Charter rights. A property-based approach would do so in a much
more limited way since only those having an interest in property could
avail themselves of the right. Moreover, protecting privacy is far more
consistent with the overall tenets of a liberal democracy such as Canada’s
under which citizens are freed from governmental constraint as they carry
on their lives unless the law indicates otherwise. It might be supposed
that there is a shared value among Canadians that our privacy should be
respected within reasonable limits. The purposive approach taken in Hunter
v. Southam29 reflects this shared value.
Indeed, it is possible that section 8 may be construed so as to protect
interests broader than privacy. Both the United States Supreme Court in
Katz30 and our Supreme Court in Hunter v. Southam31 alluded to protection
other than merely for privacy but did not find it necessary to elaborate
upon that theme for the purposes of the decisions. The effect, however,
was at a minimum to jettison the law of trespass as the basis for assessing
whether a search or seizure is reasonable. Implicitly, this approach also
means that the conduct that amounts to a search or seizure must include
state action beyond just the typical entry into a home or business premises
to look for evidence.
In Hunter v. Southam,32 Dickson J. went on to hold that the point
at which the state interest in law enforcement or other objectives may
supersede that of the individual’s privacy interest occurs when there is a
“credibly-based probability” that evidence would be located in the place
sought to be searched. This expresses the constitutional standard as
reasonable and probable grounds for believing that evidence related to
an offence will be discovered.33
29

[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 41 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
31
[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 41 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
32
[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 41 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
33
It is not, however, a rigid standard. As subsequent discussion will show, some intrusions
on privacy are permitted on a lower standard yet are very likely constitutional.
30
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He then turned to the means by which the existence of such grounds
should be determined. Expressing a preference for a warrant or other
prior authorization whenever it is feasible, he held that an independent
and impartial person must provide that authorization after receiving
evidence on oath that meets the reasonable and probable grounds standard.
As a consequence of this formulation, where a warrantless search or seizure
has occurred, the state bears the burden of showing that a warrant was
not feasible, that is, that the search was nonetheless reasonable.
The subsequent case of R. v. Collins34 built on Hunter v. Southam.35
In a case whose facts are strikingly similar to those in Brezack36 in
involving a choke hold search of an individual’s mouth, then Lamer J.
reiterated the placement of the burden on the Crown to show that a
warrantless search was reasonable. He provided criteria for this assessment:
“A search will be reasonable if it is authorized by law, the law itself
is reasonable and if the manner in which the search was carried out is
reasonable.”37
Although it was contingent upon the evidence to be adduced at the
new trial that the Court ordered, Lamer J. also engaged in an analysis of
the exclusion or admission of evidence under section 24(2) of the
Charter, the principles for which still largely govern this area of the law.
In striking contrast to the approach in Brezack,38 he found that the use of
a throat hold search would be an unreasonable manner of search absent
very clear evidence in support of its necessity.
These two cases have provided the foundation for section 8 analysis
ever since. They did not, however, address all issues. For instance, the
terms “search” and “seizure” were not defined nor was guidance given
as to when a reasonable expectation of privacy exists, when a warrant is
not feasible, or when variance from the reasonable and probable grounds
standard is justified. These issues awaited answers in later cases. As will
be seen, some of the answers have indicated regression from the purposive
privacy-based analysis in Hunter v. Southam.39

34
35
36
37
38
39

[1987] S.C.J. No. 15, 56 C.R. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.).
[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 41 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Brezack, [1949] O.J. No. 492, 9 C.R. 73 (Ont. C.A.).
R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, 56 C.R. (3d) 193, at 206 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Brezack, [1949] O.J. No. 492, 9 C.R. 73 (Ont. C.A.).
[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 41 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
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2. The Heritage of the Hunter v. Southam and Collins Framework
(a) Developments in the Case Law Consistent with the Framework
In the short term after Hunter v. Southam40 and Collins,41 however,
the decisions generally held true to the principles established in those
cases. In R. v. Duarte,42 the Supreme Court held that the same standards
apply to intercepted communications and therefore struck down the
exception to judicial authorization where one of the parties consented to
the interception. In R. v. Wong,43 the Court found that video surveillance
amounts to a search requiring prior authorization and, in R. v. Wise,44
came to the same conclusion in respect of the installation of a tracking
device on a car. Several cases held that police walking around the perimeter
of private property were engaging in a search.45
To be sure, some nuances were involved. In R. v. Evans,46 although
the Court held that the police, like any private citizen, have an implied
licence to approach the front door of a house, if they do so with the
intention of smelling marijuana, they are engaging in a search, which
was conceived of as involving a form of examination by the state that
invades a reasonable expectation of privacy. As subsequent cases have
revealed, the key to defining a search is the second aspect — the existence
of a reasonable expectation of privacy — rather than merely whether
there was some form of examination. Thus, walking along public land in
order to detect marijuana cultivation on private property was held not to
be a search,47 nor was the observation of illegal gambling machines upon
entering business premises open to the public.48 To this point, although
40

[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 41 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, 56 C.R. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.).
42
R. v. Duarte, [1990] S.C.J. No. 2, 74 C.R. (3d) 281 (S.C.C.).
43
[1990] S.C.J. No. 118, 1 C.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.).
44
[1992] S.C.J. No. 16, 11 C.R. (4th) 253 (S.C.C.). There were, however, suggestions in
this case that something less than reasonable and probable grounds might suffice for such lesser
intrusions on privacy. Parliament picked up on these suggestions in drafting ss. 492.1 and 492.2 of
the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 dealing with tracking device warrants and telephone number
recorder warrants, respectively.
45
For example, R. v. Kokesch, [1990] S.C.J. No. 117, 1 C.R. (4th) 62 (S.C.C.); R. v. Grant,
[1993] S.C.J. No. 98, 24 C.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.); R. v. Plant, [1993] S.C.J. No. 97, 24 C.R. (4th) 47
(S.C.C.); R. v. Wiley, [1993] S.C.J. No. 96, 24 C.R. (4th) 34 (S.C.C.).
46
[1996] S.C.J. No. 1, 45 C.R. (4th) 210 (S.C.C.).
47
R. v. Boersma, [1994] S.C.J. No. 63, 31 C.R. (4th) 386 (S.C.C.).
48
R. v. Fitt, [1995] N.S.J. No. 83, 38 C.R. (4th) 52 (N.S.C.A.), affd on other grounds
[1996] S.C.J. No. 6, 46 C.R. (4th) 267 (S.C.C.).
41
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the Supreme Court had not comprehensively defined what state conduct
amounts to a search, decisions such as Evans had begun to construct such
a definition. However, that project awaited the development of a means
of determining when there was a reasonable expectation of privacy, a
topic that will be discussed in more depth later on in this article.
In the meantime, in an earlier case, R. v. Dyment,49 the Court had
defined a seizure as the taking of something by a state authority without
the consent of the owner of the item if the individual from whom the item
was seized had a reasonable expectation of privacy in it. The seizing of
the accused’s blood in Dyment obviously fell within this definition. Before
long, the definition had been extended to the regulatory sphere in relation to
taking copies of documents or requiring their production.50 It was also
applied in the criminal law sphere to embrace the taking of various bodily
samples such as breath, blood, DNA, etc.,51 although the Court did not
always make clear whether the state conduct was a search or a seizure.
Interestingly, in R. v. Hufsky,52 the Court held that a requirement to
produce a driver’s licence and registration was not a search because driving
is a licensed activity with no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
documents. The Court did not consider whether the production of such
documents might be construed as a seizure and, in light of the jurisprudence
relating to the regulatory sphere,53 it might be suggested that the preferred
reasoning would have been that a seizure was involved but, due to driving
being a licensed activity, standards lower than Hunter v. Southam54 are
appropriate.

49

[1988] S.C.J. No. 82, 66 C.R. (3d) 348 (S.C.C.).
Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, Restrictive
Trade Practices Commission), [1990] S.C.J. No. 23, 76 C.R. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.); R. v. McKinlay
Transport Ltd., [1990] S.C.J. No. 25, 76 C.R. (3d) 283 (S.C.C.); Comité paritaire de l’industrie de
la chemise v. Potash; Comité paritaire de l’industrie de la chemise v. Sélection Milton, [1994]
S.C.J. No. 7, 168 N.R. 241 (S.C.C.).
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This approach to licensed areas of endeavour soon carried over into
the regulatory sphere. The Supreme Court has been consistent in holding
that inspections, production or copying of documents, and similar state
conduct will be assessed under section 8.55 Building on that approach, the
Court has also constructed a means of distinguishing regulatory processes
from criminal investigatory processes in the same statute. In R. v. Jarvis,56
the Court upheld the administrative processes for auditing and verifying
income and expenses that are set out in the Income Tax Act,57 even though
they do not meet Hunter v. Southam58 standards. However, at the point
that a criminal investigation is undertaken, the authorities must obtain a
warrant and meet those standards. Jarvis also held that the information
obtained at the administrative stage may be used in the later investigative
stage, with the distinction between the stages occurring when the purpose
has changed from regulation to determining criminal liability. Although
the distinction may be difficult to assess in some circumstances, in a
theoretical sense, the Court provided a sensible way of balancing the
societal interest in maintaining a relatively simple self-reporting taxation
scheme with the protection of privacy.
The issue of the feasibility of obtaining a warrant has also been
addressed by the courts. Hunter v. Southam59 had not taken an absolutist
position to the warrant requirement but did not attempt to stipulate when
a warrantless search or seizure might nonetheless be constitutional. The
allocation of the burden on the Crown to demonstrate the requisite
reasonableness whenever a search or seizure was shown to have been
conducted without a warrant was and is an important rule, as is the
three-pronged test set out in Collins.60 A case decided early in the Charter
era, R. v. Rao,61 had held that a warrantless search might be reasonable
in exigent circumstances and read down what was then section 10(1)(a)
55

Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, Restrictive
Trade Practices Commission), [1990] S.C.J. No. 23, 76 C.R. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.); R. v. McKinlay
Transport Ltd., [1990] S.C.J. No. 25, 76 C.R. (3d) 283 (S.C.C.); Comité paritaire de l’industrie de
la chemise v. Potash; Comité paritaire de l’industrie de la chemise v. Sélection Milton, [1994]
S.C.J. No. 7, 168 N.R. 241 (S.C.C.).
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[2002] S.C.J. No. 76, 6 C.R. (6th) 23 (S.C.C.). See also: R. v. Ling, [2002] S.C.J. No. 75,
6 C.R. (6th) 64 (S.C.C.).
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R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.).
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[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 41 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
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[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 41 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
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R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, 56 C.R. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.).
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of the Narcotic Control Act62 to comply with that approach. The Court
noted that warrantless searches or seizures of motor vehicles would
often be more justifiable because of their mobility. Subsequently, in
R. v. Grant, the Supreme Court approved of this approach and defined
exigent circumstances for the purposes of the same section as:
. . . an imminent danger of the loss, removal, destruction or disappearance
of the evidence sought in a narcotics investigation if the search or seizure
is delayed in order to obtain a warrant. 63

Obviously, whether a warrant was feasible is a factual determination
in any given case. Hence, where there is imminent danger to a person or
other similar emergency, a warrantless search or seizure would undoubtedly
be permitted.
The Supreme Court also has modified the previous common law
position in respect of entry into dwellings in order to make an arrest.
The common law permitted such entries without a warrant, provided
that a proper announcement was made.64 However, in R. v. Feeney,65 the
Court held that an entry warrant would now be required except where
the entry was in hot pursuit of the suspect. The Court left open whether
other exigent circumstances might also justify a warrantless entry. The
Parliamentary response to Feeney will be discussed in the next section.
Two other spheres of government action warrant brief mention. These
concern customs and border crossings and prisons.66 Early in the Charter
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court held that there is a lower expectation
of privacy at border crossings.67 In a later case, the Court also approved
the reasonable suspicion standard for searching a vehicle to detect
smuggling68 and for a passive bedpan vigil of someone suspected of
importing drugs.69 The prison context remains somewhat unsettled. In
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R.S.C. 1970, c. N-1.
R. v. Grant, [1993] S.C.J. No. 98, 24 C.R. (4th) 1, at 19 (S.C.C.).
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See Eccles v. Bourque, [1974] S.C.J. No. 123, 19 C.C.C. (2d) 129 (S.C.C.); R. v. Landry,
[1986] S.C.J. No. 10, 50 C.R. (3d) 55 (S.C.C.); R. v. Macooh, [1993] S.C.J. No. 28, 22 C.R. (4th) 70
(S.C.C.) and text on pp. 119-20.
65
[1997] S.C.J. No. 49, 7 C.R. (5th) 101 (S.C.C.).
66
Schools are another sphere but will be discussed later in conjunction with common law
search and seizure powers, and powers derived from more general statutory provisions.
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R. v. Simmons, [1988] S.C.J. No. 86, 66 C.R. (3d) 297 (S.C.C.). The case considered the
Customs Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-40, now replaced by the Customs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (2nd Supp.).
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R. v. Jacques, [1996] S.C.J. No. 88, 1 C.R. (5th) 229 (S.C.C.).
69
R. v. Monney, [1996] S.C.J. No. 18, 24 C.R. (5th) 97 (S.C.C.).
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Conway v. R.,70 the Supreme Court spoke rather cursorily of a greatly
reduced expectation of privacy within prisons and held that no such
expectation attached to searches of male prisoners by female guards. In
R. v. Tessling,71 an obiter suggested a low level of protected privacy.
The Ontario Court of Appeal, in R. v. Major,72 ruled that there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy, albeit low, for a prisoner and his
family in a conjugal living unit. In both contexts, cautious support may
be given to accepting a lower expectation of privacy, although the
Conway ruling would be worrisome if it meant that prisoners had no
privacy protection whatsoever.
In general, the section 8 jurisprudence just discussed has been
consistent with the framework established in the two leading cases. The
exceptions to the warrant requirement in exigent circumstances and reduced
levels of privacy in the regulatory, customs and prisons spheres are
generally sensible and an appropriate balance between protecting privacy
and the practical necessities of law enforcement and regulation. The lead
taken by the courts has also prompted legislative responses that are
frequently, although not always, in compliance with the framework.
Two topics have not yet been discussed. One concerns what might
be viewed as departures from this framework that have unfortunately
weakened the protection for privacy that seemingly lies behind section
8. The other topic concerns areas where the legislative branch has not
acted but where the Supreme Court and lower courts have constructed
police powers or tests for the exercise of such powers from the common
law, or by implication, from more general statutory provisions. These
initiatives by the judiciary have almost certainly resulted in making
legislative action unlikely in these spheres. But before tackling those
subjects, let me move to the legislative responses to the section 8
framework.
(b) Legislative Responses to the Framework
On many occasions, Parliament has been obliged to respond to case
law that has struck down a law or indicated that a new law is needed. In
general, these legislative responses have been of three types. Some have
70
Weatherall v. Canada (Attorney General), [1993] S.C.J. No. 81, 23 C.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Conway v. R.”].
71
[2004] S.C.J. No. 63, 23 C.R. (6th) 207, at para. 29 (S.C.C.).
72
[2004] O.J. No. 2651, 23 C.R. (6th) 294 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [2005]
S.C.C.A. No. 106 (S.C.C.).
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been direct responses to the jurisprudence, usually in the form of new
warrant provisions or amendments to existing provisions to render them
constitutional. The second category consists of what might be termed
anticipatory responses in that Parliament draws upon aspects of the case
law, such as obiter dicta or issues deliberately left open by the courts, to
enact legislation to cover such situations.73 The final class of response
consists of what has been termed “in your face” responses that are in at
least some respects beyond what the Supreme Court of Canada has
mandated.74 On some occasions, legislative responses have embraced
two or even all three categories. Provincial and territorial legislatures
have also acted in these ways, at least in the first two areas.
Thus, we have seen a plethora of new search and seizure provisions
enacted by Parliament in response to Supreme Court decisions. Duarte75
led to amendments to the wiretap provisions in Part VI of the Criminal
Code,76 first, to eliminate the consent interception route found wanting
by the Court and, second, to bring the issue of exclusion or admission of
wiretap evidence into line with section 24(2) of the Charter, rather than
providing for automatic exclusion where Part VI has not been complied
with. Wong77 led to the passage of section 487.01 of the Code, although
the provision is much broader than merely permitting video surveillance.78
Wise resulted in the enactment of section 492.1 to permit tracking device
warrants; in so doing, Parliament evidently relied on an obiter in Wise
that suggested that the permissible standard for such warrants might be
at the level of a reasonable suspicion.79 Parliament also created telephone
number recorder warrants in section 492.2 on the same reasonable
suspicion standard. After R. v. Stillman80 held that a warrant was required in
order to obtain DNA and other bodily samples, Parliament responded
73

For a far more comprehensive discussion of the interplay between the judiciary and
Parliament than I am able to provide in this short article, see: James Stribopoulos, “In Search of
Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Police Powers, and the Charter” (2005) 31 Queen’s L.J. 1, especially
at 61-73.
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and Equality by Assertion at What Cost?” (2000) 28 C.R. (5th) 275, although a computer search
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R. v. Duarte, [1990] S.C.J. No. 2, 74 C.R. (3d) 281 (S.C.C.).
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R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
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R. v. Wong, [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, 1 C.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.).
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Indeed, the section is so generally worded that it has been held to authorize a wide range
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with a series of warrant provisions in sections 487.04-487.092 to permit
such measures. Parliament reacted to Feeney81 by passing sections
529-529.5. In addition to providing for entry warrants, these provisions
provide for warrantless entry in exigent circumstances, a matter left open
by the Court, and, in the case of imminent bodily harm or death, permit
entry on the lower standard of a reasonable suspicion.
Parliament has also paid heed to what has been decided about the
warrant requirement. The design of legislative provisions now generally
permits warrantless searches or seizures where the grounds for a warrant
exist but where there are also exigent circumstances.82 Section 487.11 of
the Code, for example, applies this regime to section 487 and section
492.1 tracking device warrants, although not for the more intrusive DNA
and bodily sample warrants. A similar provision is contained in section
11(7) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.83 However, Parliament
has also enacted section 487.1 of the Code, which permits the use of
telewarrants where it would not be practicable to obtain a regular warrant.
Therefore, before exercising a warrantless search or seizure power, the
police ought to consider whether a telewarrant would be feasible and the
exercise of a warrantless power should be assessed in that light.
With the exception of the overly broad general warrant provision in
section 487.01, these statutory provisions are supportable even where
they depart from full Hunter v. Southam84 standards. The lower level of
intrusion of tracking device and number recorder warrants and the reduced
expectation of privacy involved in moving about in public both lend
justification to a lower standard, the key being that in each case the
technological device monitors only the location of a vehicle or telephone
numbers, respectively, rather than activities or conversations. Similarly,
the aim of preventing bodily harm or death is sufficient to justify entry
on the lesser reasonable suspicion standard.
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(c) Departures from the Privacy Framework
Unfortunately, despite the efforts of the Court in Hunter v. Southam85
to at a minimum protect an interest in privacy, there is a line of cases since
then that is not entirely consistent with the rejection of the narrower
property-based approach. These cases have restricted the establishment
of a reasonable expectation of privacy in two ways: first, by narrowing
the informational aspect of privacy and, second, by giving more primacy
to the existence of a possessory or proprietary interest.
Although Dyment86 is itself consistent with the privacy approach, it
may have been the genesis of some of this regression. There, the Court
found that an unreasonable seizure occurred when a medical practitioner
turned a blood sample over to the police. This was primarily because of
the violation of the sanctity of Dyment’s body but also because of another
aspect of privacy, information about a person.87 As La Forest J. put it:
In modern society, especially, retention of information about oneself is
extremely important. We may, for one reason or another, wish or be
compelled to reveal such information, but situations abound where the
reasonable expectations of the individual that the information shall remain
confidential to the persons to whom, and restricted to the purposes for
which it is divulged must be protected. Governments at all levels have
in recent years recognized this and have devised rules and regulations
to restrict the uses of information collected by them to those for which
it was obtained; see, for example, the Privacy Act, S.C. 1980-81-82-83,
c. 111.88

This was a strong statement in support of protecting personal
information from state scrutiny. Unfortunately, it was soon distinguished.
In R. v. Plant,89 a majority of the Court held that computer records
showing the electrical consumption at a suspect’s house were not
sufficiently personal and confidential to attract section 8 scrutiny. In other
words, there was no expectation of privacy in the computer records. The
majority reiterated the three facets of privacy — personal, territorial and
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informational — that had been referred to in Dyment90 and, in relation to
the informational aspect, restricted its ambit to
a biographical core of personal information which individuals in a
free and democratic society would wish to maintain and control from
dissemination to the state. This would include information which tends
to reveal intimate details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the
individual.91

Justice McLachlin (as she then was) dissented on this point, noting
that the computer records in question were not available to the public and
therefore required a warrant to infringe upon the expectation of privacy
in them.
The Court soon also moved more in the direction of a territorial-based
approach to determining whether an individual has a reasonable expectation
of privacy. This occurred in R. v. Edwards.92 The accused sought to
assert such an expectation of privacy in his girlfriend’s apartment. He
stayed there from time to time, kept clothes and other belongings there,
and had a key to the premises. The Court rejected his argument, largely
on the basis that he did not have the ability to regulate access to the
premises and did not contribute to the rent or other living expenses. In
coming to this conclusion, the Court indicated that the determination of
whether or not a reasonable expectation of privacy existed should be
based on the “totality of the circumstances”, which should include
consideration of the following factors:
(i) presence at the time of the search;
(ii) possession or control of the property or place searched;
(iii) ownership of the property or place;
(iv) historical use of the property or item;
(v) the ability to regulate access, including the right to admit or exclude
others from the place;
(vi) the existence of a subjective expectation of privacy; and
(vii) the objective reasonableness of the expectation. 93
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[1996] S.C.J. No. 11, 45 C.R. (4th) 307 (S.C.C.).
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Edwards has therefore defined a search as a form of examination by
the state but only where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy that
is determined in this property-oriented manner. This had the unfortunate
effect of shifting the focus of attention back in the direction of the law
of trespass that underlay the pre-Charter law and which was rejected in
Hunter v. Southam.94 It is also reminiscent of the risk analysis that the
Court had firmly rejected in Duarte95 and Wong,96 that is, the notion that
an interest in privacy ceases to exist when a person does not have control
over the place in which the authorities are undertaking what otherwise
would be a search or seizure. Edwards is therefore in some sense a reversal
of previous but relatively recent jurisprudence.
This approach was reinforced in R. v. Belnavis,97 in which the Court
held that a passenger in a motor vehicle has a reasonable expectation of
privacy only if she has some degree of control over the vehicle, such as
prior use or a relationship with the driver or owner that indicates a
degree of access or privilege over the car. It is, of course, both true and
commonsensical that there should be a reduced expectation of privacy in
a vehicle relative to a dwelling. However, the effect of Belnavis and
Edwards98 is to restrict privacy interests to a very great extent such that
an accused who does not demonstrate some proprietary or possessory
interest will have difficulty in establishing the necessary reasonable
expectation of privacy to invoke section 8 protection. 99 By way of
illustration, one commentator has suggested that a child living in her
parents’ home may not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in her own
bedroom.100 Moreover, to deny privacy protection for most passengers in
motor vehicles provides great latitude to the police to conduct random
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searches of both vehicles and passengers with the knowledge that their
conduct will very likely be beyond constitutional scrutiny.
As a result of these developments, it was but a short step for the
Court to follow Plant101 in Tessling102 to hold that infrared technology
used by an airplane to detect heat emanating from a home also did not
infringe the informational sphere of privacy protected by section 8. The
Court did indicate that the issue could be revisited in light of future
technological advances but these decisions are troubling. It is highly
debatable whether a person’s confidentiality is invaded through knowledge
of electrical consumption or heat emanations. More troubling, however,
is the tendency of lower courts to build upon the reasoning to find that
other forms of investigation are also not within the ambit of section 8.
This has recently come to the fore through a series of sniffer dog
cases. Most such cases have involved the use of dogs specially trained to
detect illegal drugs to sniff luggage in public transportation facilities.103
The courts have been fairly consistent in applying Plant104 and Tessling105
to hold that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in such situations
since an odour of marijuana or other drugs is seemingly not a part of the
biographical core of an individual.106 In one case, R. v. M. (A.),107 the
Court held that a random use of a sniffer dog on the personal belongings
of students in a school was a search attracting Charter scrutiny because
of the randomness and breadth of the police action. M. (A.) and one of
the other cases, R. v. Brown,108 have been appealed to the Supreme Court
of Canada and decisions are pending. Although Plant109 and Tessling110
are unlikely to be overruled, it is to be hoped that the Supreme Court does
not sanction extensions from those cases and provides greater guidance
101
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for determining when technological surveillance techniques amount to a
search by intruding upon a reasonable expectation of privacy.
The trend through these cases has been to regress from the broad,
purposive approach to the protection of privacy taken in Hunter v.
Southam.111 This is unfortunate. We should not hastily rule out an
expectation of privacy. It is entirely understandable that the extent of the
expectation might vary with the context, thus permitting warrantless
searches in some situations and searches on something less than reasonable
and probable grounds in others. Consider an illustration to make this
point: typically, garbage is taken to be an abandonment of a reasonable
expectation of privacy.112 What, however, of the citizen who herself or
through a family member inadvertently throws important financial or
other personal information into the garbage? Could it safely be said that
she has given up her expectation of privacy? To guard against snooping by
the authorities, should all citizens be advised to buy shredders to shred the
myriad papers containing personal information that we all throw into
the garbage on a regular basis? If not, we should also seriously consider
whether luggage or other personal belongings, even if in a public place,
or heat and electrical consumption information similarly give rise to
privacy protection. As I suggested at the beginning of this paper,
in considering these issues, the operative question should be whether a
person not carrying or growing drugs should be free from state scrutiny
in the absence of reasonable and probable grounds and, absent exigent
circumstances, a search warrant.
(d) Judicial Activism of a Different Type
A recurrent criticism of the courts, particularly the Supreme Court
of Canada, is that they engage in “judicial activism”. The charge is, as
McLachlin C.J.C. has put it, “usurping the functions of Parliament; of
making the law rather than interpreting and applying it”.113 As the Chief
Justice has noted, those advancing the criticism may come from all points
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on the political spectrum.114 The allegation should be assessed with some
understanding of the role of the judiciary in the common law legal
tradition and sympathy for the fact that judges have been obliged to
interpret and make sense of constitutional guarantees that are framed in
vague and general language. In respect of the first, the long-standing
heritage of the judiciary incrementally changing judge-made common law
to suit contemporary demands is largely acceptable because Parliament
and legislatures have sometimes chosen not to enact statutes or pass
regulations to change the common law. The second is simply a fact of
legal life in a country with a written constitution that must be interpreted
and applied in a changing world.
In this section, judicial activism is discussed in two much narrower
forms: the creation of common law search and seizure powers through
the ancillary powers doctrine, and the extension of such powers from
general statutory provisions. My submission is that these are areas where
judicial activism is inappropriate.
The Supreme Court of Canada has now created police powers through
the ancillary powers doctrine on several occasions, mostly through the
approach taken in an obscure English case, R. v. Waterfield,115 a case
which itself rejected the creation of a police power on its facts and
which has been little considered in England. Thus, in R. v. Godoy,116 the
Court held that there was a common law power for the police to enter a
dwelling to investigate a 911 phone call that had been disconnected. In
R. v. Mann,117 the same Court approved the power to briefly detain
an individual for investigative purposes on the reduced standard of a
reasonable suspicion of criminality. As a part of this new power, the
Court granted police the power to search for weapons, although on the
higher standard of reasonable and probable grounds. More recently, in
R. v. Clayton,118 the Supreme Court extended Mann to the extent of
permitting a roadblock to stop and search vehicles in response to a
complaint about firearms even though the accused’s vehicle did not
match the description of the suspect vehicles.
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In other contexts, the Court has denied that it is creating a new
police power but has extended existing powers through implication from
more general statutes. This occurred, for instance, in R. v. M. (M.R.),119
where the Court held that school officials have the power to search
students and their belongings by inference from more general education
statutes. These searches may be conducted without a warrant and on the
loose standard that there must be reasonable grounds to believe that a
breach of school rules or discipline has occurred. In a situation much
less directly related to search and seizure law, R. v. Orbanski,120 a
majority of the Court found that the police have the power to request a
citizen to perform physical sobriety tests or ask questions about alcohol
consumption, even though there was no statutory basis for either.121 The
reasoning was that these were section 1 limitations on the right to counsel
by necessary implication from or the operating requirements of the
legislation governing drinking and driving.
All of these decisions have attracted a groundswell of criticism from
academic and practising lawyers that is so voluminous that I will not cite
it here. There are, however, some telling arguments against this trend:
whether or not to grant the police certain powers to search, seize or do
other things should be a democratic decision for legislators; if, as Hunter v.
Southam held, the purpose of the Charter is to constrain government
action, surely it is wrong for the courts to grant governments more powers.
We should recall that the Court in that case struck down the legislation
in question, refusing to consider the alternative remedies of reading in or
reading down:
While the courts are guardians of the Constitution and of individuals’
rights under it, it is the legislature’s responsibility to enact legislation
that embodies appropriate safeguards to comply with the Constitution’s
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requirements. It should not fall to the courts to fill in the details that will
render legislative lacunae constitutional. 122

The creation of common law powers by the Court is an unfortunate
betrayal of that position. It is also after-the-fact reasoning that by definition
renders the law unknowable until the courts create the powers; by
fashioning such powers, the courts deny citizens a real opportunity to
challenge the constitutionality of the law in question (after all, would the
Supreme Court of Canada recognize that it had previously created an
unconstitutional law?); and, finally, it renders the law arbitrary because
it cannot be known in advance when the courts will approve of police
conduct in this manner. If the ability to know the law in advance is seen
to be a component of the rule of law, the Supreme Court has been remiss
in not at least admitting that the rule of law has been weakened through
this line of cases. Moreover, the trend is clearly in the wrong direction
of creating and expanding such powers. Clayton123 is worrisome because
it appears as though the Supreme Court will now retroactively approve
of police conduct that is considered to be reasonably necessary in the
circumstances.124
The granddaddy of common law police powers is, of course, the search
and seizure power most frequently exercised: the power to search an
individual who has been lawfully arrested. Because it precedes Waterfield125
and is so deeply entrenched, the courts have not had to rely upon the
tests developed in that case. Instead, the police are entitled to frisk
search an arrestee without a warrant and virtually automatically, so long
as it is for a valid objective in pursuit of the ends of criminal justice, is
not conducted in an abusive manner and does not extend beyond safety
concerns, preventing escape or preserving evidence.126 Happily, in R. v.
Golden,127 the Supreme Court held that, to justify a strip search, there
must be reasonable and probable grounds for believing that evidence
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would be located. As previously noted, Stillman128 caused Parliament to
enact warrant provisions for the taking of bodily samples but, otherwise,
Parliament has been content to permit the courts to make the law in this
area. Grey areas remain, however, about other measures, such as body
cavity searches. It is an area that should be legislated with clear standards
for the police that can then be assessed by the courts.
These developments have occurred in part because the Supreme
Court and lower courts have failed to notice the extent to which they have
expanded the arsenal of police powers and the problems engendered by
doing so. They have also happened because Parliament and legislatures
have not acted to pass legislation that could then be tested through the
courts in the usual manner. Due to the frequent invocation of the
Waterfield129 test, I am skeptical that these decisions will be reconsidered.
I would hope, however, that recognition will be given to the problems
inherent in this type of judicial activism and that therefore the Supreme
Court will refrain from creating any additional powers or extensions of
them.
Parliament should also assert its authority and legislate in some of
these areas. It is not unknown in the common law world for there to be
legislation and regulations governing police investigations, including
interrogations of suspects and search and seizure issues. For instance, both
the United Kingdom130 and the Australian state of Queensland have done
so for some years.131 In addition to providing welcome clarity and prior
announcement of the law, this would afford litigants the opportunity to
have such legislation assessed by the courts. For the judiciary, it would
place them in their proper role as guardians and interpreters of the
Constitution, rather than as the makers of the law.132
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(e) The Impact of Section 24(2) of the Charter
It will be recalled that the pre-Charter law on search and seizure was
not devoid of legal standards. The difficulty in enforcing those standards
was, however, in the lack of meaningful remedies. The advent of the
Charter provided for remedies, including, as was seen in Hunter v.
Southam,133 the striking down of legislation that is not in compliance with
Charter requirements. For the most part, however, the most appropriate
and frequent remedy that is sought is the exclusion of evidence pursuant
to section 24(2). Collins134 established the framework for this analysis,
although there was a terminological shift to conscriptive and nonconscriptive evidence in Stillman.135 The question is whether the exclusion
of evidence is an effective remedy to buttress the protection of privacy that
has been afforded through the myriad and confusing cases just discussed.
In Collins,136 Lamer J. indicated that the purpose behind excluding
evidence obtained through a Charter breach was not to deter improper
police conduct. Rather, it was to avoid the courts becoming further
implicated in that misconduct, thereby reflecting badly on the administration
of justice. Nevertheless, it would be naïve to suppose that disapproval of
police conduct is not a consideration when evidence is excluded. The
Supreme Court has said as much on several occasions.137 In the search
and seizure context, however, the evidence is frequently placed in the
non-conscriptive category, with the result that the virtually automatic
exclusion that occurs under the trial fairness rubric is not applicable.138
In such cases, whether the evidence is excluded or admitted is determined
under the factors relating to the seriousness of the violation and the
balancing of the effects of exclusion or admission on the administration
of justice. The frequency of exclusion has changed over time with the
result that exclusion now appears to occur more often, although still not
nearly as often as in the case of conscriptive evidence.139 Is this, however,
133
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a sufficient development to enable us to achieve some measure of
deterrence of misconduct? The answer is probably not but it also does
not mean that we should abandon the effort.
One of the problems is to whom deterrence is to be directed in the
search and seizure context. Were the issue solely whether the police or
other state officials involved in gathering evidence might be deterred
from impropriety, there might be at least a degree of sharpness to the
debate. Failure to abide by known legal requirements might (and should)
elevate the seriousness of the violation to the point where exclusion
should be the presumptive remedy. Unfortunately, in a legal regime where
common law powers have been frequently developed, it is very difficult
to assume the requisite knowledge. Instead, there is an incentive for the
police to do what they consider to be necessary in the circumstances in
the hope that the courts will later find it to be reasonable. Clayton140 has
now enshrined this approach.
But it is a more complicated issue than that. Judges issue search
warrants or assess whether a warrant should have been required and,
according to the available data, do not rigorously insist upon adherence
to required legal standards.141 But there are no legal consequences for a
justice or judge who has failed to insist on the legal requirements for the
issuance of a search warrant nor, in a system that requires the independence
of the judiciary, should there be. Unless the judiciary is meticulous in
requiring compliance with legal standards, its involvement in the process
diffuses whatever deterrent effect there might be from excluding evidence
that was improperly obtained.142 That is, it would be necessary to both
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deter improper police misconduct and improper application of the law
by judges, a tall order indeed since we are rather hapless at achieving
deterrence through the sentencing process where there is a far more direct
connection between the misconduct and a sanction.
Although it is apparent that efforts to achieve compliance with the
law of search and seizure will be imperfect, the answer may lie as a
combination of two steps. First, more frequent exclusion of nonconscriptive evidence, particularly where there has been a failure to
abide by well-established requirements, would be useful even if it is
acknowledged that a greater likelihood of exclusion will not cause an
overnight change in police behaviour. Second, in spite of the comments
by the majority in Clayton143 that it should not be considered in relation
to section 24(2) of the Charter, we might devote much more attention
and resources to the training of police and other investigative officials
so that they are more cognizant of their legal responsibilities. We could
also provide for greater training, particularly of justices of the peace,
who are often charged with the responsibility for issuing search warrants
to see that they are familiar with the legal requirements that they must
oversee.144 If we did so and there were still instances of failing to abide
by well-known requirements, the likelihood of exclusion of evidence
should surely be increased.145 At the very least, the police should not be
rewarded by having non-conscriptive evidence obtained through noncompliance with known law admitted.

IV. CONCLUSION
Much has happened in the 25 years that have passed since the Charter
came into force. This is certainly apparent in the law of search and seizure,
whose pre-Charter form is scarcely recognizable today. That said, a
promising beginning has had mixed developments since. The framework
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established early on in Hunter v. Southam146 and Collins147 was sound
and led to other improvements in protecting privacy. Nevertheless, the
retrenchment that has occurred through decisions such as Tessling,148
Edwards,149 and Belnavis150 is disappointing and regressive. While it is
generally true that legislatures have paid heed to what the courts have
required, this has not always occurred. Some of the responsibility lies
with the judiciary for stepping too quickly into the breach and creating
common law police and other powers. Some of it lies with the legislators,
who have too often been content for the courts to assume that role. In
assessing the state of the present search and seizure law, we would do
well to recall the beginnings of the Charter era and attempt to return to the
broader perspective of protecting against undue infringements of privacy.
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